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We construct risk-neutral return probability distributions from S&P 500 op-
tions data over the decade 2003 to 2013, separable into pre-crisis, crisis and
post-crisis regimes. The pre-crisis period is characterized by increasing realized
and, especially, option-implied returns. This translates into transient unsus-
tainable price growth that may be identified as a bubble. Granger tests detect
causality running from option-implied returns to Treasury Bill yields in the
pre-crisis regime with a lag of a few days, and the other way round during
the post-crisis regime with much longer lags (50 to 200 days). This suggests
a transition from an abnormal regime preceding the crisis to a “new normal”
post-crisis. The difference between realized and option-implied returns remains
roughly constant prior to the crisis but diverges in the post-crisis phase, which
may be interpreted as an increase of the representative investor’s risk aversion.
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1. Introduction
The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 brought a sudden end to a widespread market exu-
berance in investors’ expectations. A number of scholars and pundits had warned ex ante
of the non-sustainability of certain pre-crisis economic developments, as documented by
Bezemer (2011). Those who warned of the crisis identified as the common elements in
their thinking the destabilizing role of uncontrolled expansion of financial assets and debt,
the flow of funds, and the impact of behaviors resulting from uncertainty and bounded
rationality. However, these analyses were strongly at variance with the widespread belief
in the “Great Moderation” (Stock and Watson, 2003) and in the beneficial and stabilizing
properties of financial derivatives markets by their supposed virtue of dispersing risk glob-
ally (Summers et al., 1999; Greenspan, 2005). In hindsight, it became clear to everyone
that it was a grave mistake to ignore issues related to systemic coupling and resulting
cascade risks (Bartram et al., 2009; Hellwig, 2009). But could we do better in the future
and identify unsustainable market exuberance ex ante, to diagnose stress in the system in
real time before a crisis starts?
The present article offers a new perspective on identifying growing risk by focussing
on growth expectations embodied in financial option markets. We analyze data from the
decade around the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 over the period from 2003 to 2013.1
We retrieve the full risk-neutral probability measure of implied returns and analyze its
characteristics over the course of the last decade. Applying a change point detection
method (Killick et al., 2012), we endogenously identify the beginning and end of the Global
Financial Crisis as indicated by the options data. We consistently identify the beginning
and end of the Crisis to be June 2007 and May 2009, which is in agreement with the
timeline given by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (2009).2
The resulting pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes differ from each other in several
important aspects. First, during the pre-crisis period, but not in the crisis and post-crisis
periods, we identify a continuing increase of S&P 500 expected returns. This corresponds
to super-exponential growth expectations of the price. By contrast, regular expectation
regimes prevail in the crisis and post-crisis periods. Second, the difference between realized
and option-implied returns remains roughly constant prior to the crisis but diverges in the
post-crisis phase. This phenomenon may be interpreted as an increase of the representative
investor’s risk aversion. Third, Granger-causality tests show that changes of option-implied
returns Granger-cause changes of Treasury Bill yields with a lag of few days in the pre-crisis
period, while the reverse is true at lags of 50 to 200 days in the post-crisis period. This
role reversal suggests that Fed policy was responding to, rather than leading, the financial
market development during the pre-crisis period, but that the economy returned to a “new
normal” regime post-crisis.
1Related existing work has considered data from pre-crisis (Figlewski, 2010) and crisis (Birru and Figlewski,
2012).
2See section 3.2 for more details on market and policy events marking the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
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The majority of related option market studies have used option data for the evaluation of
risk. An early contribution to this strand of work is Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo (2000) who proposed
a nonparametric risk management approach based on a value at risk computation with
option-implied state-price densities. Another popular measure of option-implied volatility
is the Volatility Index (VIX), which is constructed out of options on the S&P 500 stock
index and is meant to represent the market’s expectation of stock market volatility over
the next 30 days (Chicago Board Options Exchange, 2009). Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)
extended the VIX framework to an “investor fears index” by estimating jump tail risk for
the left and right tail separately. Bali et al. (2011) define a general option-implied measure
of riskiness taking into account an investor’s utility and wealth leading to asset allocation
implications. What sets our work apart is the focus on identifying the long and often slow
build-up of risk during an irrationally exuberant market that typically precedes a crisis.
Inverting the same logic, scholars have used option price data to estimate the risk atti-
tude of the representative investor as well as its changes. These studies, however, typically
impose stationarity in one way or another. Jackwerth (2000), for example, empirically
derives risk aversion functions from option prices and realized returns on the S&P 500
index around the crash of 1987 by assuming a constant return probability distribution. In
a similar way, Rosenberg and Engle (2002) analyze the S&P 500 over four years in the
early 1990s by fitting a stochastic volatility model with constant parameters. Bliss and
Panigirtzoglou (2004), working with data for the FTSE 100 and S&P 500, propose another
approach that assumes stationarity in the risk aversion functions. Whereas imposing sta-
tionarity is already questionable in “normal” times, it is certainly hard to justify for a time
period covering markedly different regimes as around the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
We therefore proceed differently and merely relate return expectations implicit in option
prices to market developments, in particular to the S&P 500 stock index and yields on
Treasury Bills. We use the resulting data trends explicitly to identify the pre-crisis exu-
berance in the trends of market expectations and to make comparative statements about
changing risk attitudes in the market.
The importance of market expectation trends has not escaped the attention of many
researchers who focus on ‘bubbles’ (Galbraith, 2009; Sornette, 2003; Shiller, 2005; Soros,
2009; Kindleberger and Aliber, 2011). One of us summarizes their role as follows: “In a
given financial bubble, it is the expectation of future earnings rather than present economic
reality that motivates the average investor. History provides many examples of bubbles
driven by unrealistic expectations of future earnings followed by crashes” (Sornette, 2014).
While there is an enormous econometric literature on attempts to test whether a market is
in a bubble or not, to our knowledge our approach is the first trying to do so by measuring
and evaluating the market’s expectations directly.3
3For the econometric literature regarding assessments as to whether a market is in a bubble or not see
Stiglitz (1990) (and the corresponding special issue of the Journal of Economic Perspectives), Bhat-
tacharya and Yu (2008) (and the corresponding special issue of the Review of Financial Studies), as well
as Camerer (1989), Scheinkman and Xing (2003), Jarrow et al. (2011), Evanoff et al. (2012), Lleo and
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This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 details the estimation of the risk-neutral
return probability distributions, the identification of regime change points, and the causal-
ity tests regarding market returns and expectations. Section 3 summarizes our findings,
in particular the evidence concerning pre-crisis growth of expected returns resulting in
super-exponential price growth. Section 4 concludes with a discussion of our findings.
2. Materials and Methods
2.1. Estimating risk-neutral densities
Inferring information from option exchanges is guided by the fundamental theorem of asset
pricing stating that, in a complete market, an asset price is the discounted expected value of
future payoffs under the unique risk-neutral measure (see e.g. Delbaen and Schachermayer,
1994). Denoting that measure by Q and the risk-neutral density by f , respectively, the
current price C0 of a standard European call option on a stock with price at maturity ST
and strike K can therefore be expressed as
C0(K) = e
−rfT EQ0 [max(ST −K, 0)] = e−rfT
∫ ∞
K
(ST −K)f(ST )dST , (1)
where rf is the risk-free rate and T the time to maturity. From this equation, we would
like to extract the density f(ST ), as it reflects the representative investor’s expectation of
the future price under risk-neutrality. Since all quantities but the density are observable,
inverting equation (1) for f(ST ) becomes a numerical task.
Several methods for inverting have been proposed, of which Jackwerth (2004) provides an
excellent review. In this study, we employ a method by Figlewski (2010) that is essentially
model-free and combines standard smoothing techniques in implied-volatility space and a
new method of completing the density with appropriate tails. Tails are added using the
theory of Generalized Extreme Value distributions, which are capable of characterizing very
different behaviors of extreme events.4 This method cleverly combines mid-prices of call
and put options by only taking into account data from at-the-money and out-of-the-money
regions, thus recovering non-standard features of risk-neutral densities such as bimodality,
fat tails, and general asymmetry.
Our analysis covers fundamentally different market regimes around the Global Financial
Crisis. A largely nonparametric approach, rather than a parametric one, seems therefore
appropriate, because an important question that we shall ask is whether and how distri-
butions actually changed from one regime to the next. We follow Figlewski’s method in
Ziemba (2012), Anderson et al. (2013), Phillips et al. (2013), Hu¨sler et al. (2013).
4As Birru and Figlewski (2012) note, the theoretically correct extreme value distribution class is the
Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) because estimating beyond the range of observable strikes cor-
responds to the peak-over-threshold method. For our purposes, both approaches are known to lead to
equivalent results.
4
most steps, and additionally weight points by open interest when interpolating in implied-
volatility space – a proxy of the information content of individual sampling points permitted
by our data. We give a more detailed review of the method in appendix A.
2.2. Data
We use end-of-day data for standard European call and put options on the S&P 500
stock index provided by Stricknet5 for a period from January 1st, 2003 to October 23rd,
2013. The raw data includes bid and ask quotes as well as open interest across various
maturities. For this study, we focus on option contracts with quarterly expiration dates,
which usually fall on the Saturday following the third Friday in March, June, September
and December, respectively. Closing prices of the index, dividend yields and interest rates
of the 3-month Treasury Bill as a proxy of the risk-free rate are extracted from Thomson
Reuters Datastream.
We apply the following filter criteria as in Figlewski (2010). We ignore quotes with bids
below $0.50 and those that are larger than $20.00 in the money, as such bids exhibit very
large spreads. Data points for which the midprice violates no-arbitrage conditions are also
excluded. Options with time to maturity of less than 14 calendar days are discarded, as the
relevant strike ranges shrink to smaller and smaller lengths resulting in a strong peaking of
the density.6 We are thus left with data for 2,311 observations over the whole time period
and estimate risk-neutral densities and implied quantities for each of these days.
2.3. Subperiod classification
As the Global Financial Crisis had a profound and lasting impact on option-implied quan-
tities, it is informative for the sake of comparison to perform analyses to subperiods associ-
ated with regimes classifiable as pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis. Rather than defining the
relevant subperiods with historical dates, we follow an endogenous segmentation approach
for identifying changes in the statistical properties of the risk-neutral densities. Let us
assume we have an ordered sequence of data x1:n = (x1, x2, ..., xn) of length n, e.g. daily
values of a moment or tail shape parameter of the risk-neutral densities over n days. A
change point occurs if there exists a time 1 ≤ k < n such that the mean of set {x1, ..., xk}
is statistically different from the mean of set {xk+1, ..., xn} (Killick et al., 2012). As a
sequence of data may also have multiple change points, various frameworks to search for
them have been developed. The binary segmentation algorithm by Scott and Knott (1974)
is arguably the most established detection method of this kind. It starts by identifying a
single change point in a data sequence, proceeds iteratively on the two segments before
and after the detected change and stops if no further change point is found.
5The data is accessible via stricknet.com, where it can be purchased retrospectively.
6Figlewski (2010) points out that rollovers of hedge positions into later maturities around contract expi-
rations may lead to badly behaved risk-neutral density estimates.
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As in the case of estimating risk-neutral densities, we refrain from making assumptions
regarding the underlying process that generates the densities and choose a nonparametric
approach. We employ the numerical implementation of the binary segmentation algorithm
by Killick et al. (2012) with the cumulative sum test statistic (CUSUM) proposed by Page
(1954) to search for at most two change points. The idea is that the cumulative sum,
S(t) :=
∑t
i=1 xi, 1 ≤ t < n, will have different slopes before and after the change point. As
opposed to moving averages, using cumulative sums allows rapid detection of both small
and large changes. We state the mathematical formulation of the test statistic in appendix
B.7
2.4. Determining lag-lead structures
Option-implied quantities may be seen as expectations of the (representative) investor
under Q. A popular question in the context of self-referential financial markets is whether
expectations drive prices or vice versa. To get a feeling of the causality, we analyze the
lag-lead structure between the time series based on the classical method due to Granger
(1969). Informally, ‘Granger causality’ means that the knowledge of one quantity is useful
in forecasting another. Formally, given two time series Xt and Yt, we test whether Yt
Granger-causes Xt at lag m as follows. We first estimate the univariate autoregression
Xt =
m∑
j=1
ajXt−j + εt, (2)
where εt is an uncorrelated white-noise series. We then estimate the augmented model
with lagged variables
Xt =
m∑
j=1
bjXt−j +
m∑
j=1
cjYt−j + νt, (3)
where νt is another uncorrelated white-noise series. An F -test shows if the lagged variables
collectively add explanatory power. The null hypothesis “Yt does not Granger cause Xt” is
that the unrestricted model (3) does not provide a significantly better fit than the restricted
model (2). It is rejected if the coefficients {cj , j = 1...m} are statistically different from
zero as a group. Since the model is only defined for stationary time series, we will test
for Granger causality with standardized incremental time series in identified subperiods as
described in section 2.3.
7Interested readers may consult Brodsky and Darkhovsky (1993) as well as Cso¨rgo¨ and Horva´th (1997)
for a deeper discussion of theory, applications, and potential pitfalls of these methods.
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3. Results
3.1. First-to-fourth return moment analyses
We start by analyzing the moments and tail shape parameters of the option-implied risk-
neutral densities over the whole period (see Figure 1). For comparability, we rescale the
price densities by the S&P 500 index level St, i.e. assess f(ST /St) instead of f(ST ).
8 In
general, we recover similar values to the ones found by Figlewski (2010) over the period 1996
to 2008. The annualized option-implied log-returns of the S&P 500 stock index excluding
dividends are defined as
rt =
1
T − t
∫ ∞
0
log
(
ST
St
)
f(ST )dST . (4)
They are on average negative with a mean value of −3%, and exhibit strong fluctuations
with a standard deviation of 4%. This surprising finding may be explained by the impact
of the Global Financial Crisis and by risk aversion of investors as explained below. The
annualized second moment, also called risk-neutral volatility, is on average 20% (standard
deviation of 8%). During the crisis from June 22nd, 2007 to May 4th, 2009, we observe an
increase in risk-neutral volatility to 29± 12%.
A skewness of −1.5± 0.9 and excess kurtosis of 10± 12 indicate strong deviations from
log-normality, albeit subject to large fluctuations.9 During the crisis, we measure a third
(−0.9± 0.3) and fourth moment (4.4± 1.6) of the risk-neutral densities closer to those of
a log-normal distribution than before or after the crisis. Birru and Figlewski (2012) find
a similar dynamic using intraday prices for S&P 500 Index options. For the period from
September 2006 until October 2007, they report an average skewness of −1.9 and excess
kurtosis of 11.9, whereas from September to November 2008 these quantities change to
−0.7 and 3.5, respectively.
As the fourth moment is difficult to interpret for a strongly skewed density, one must
be careful with the implication of these findings. One interpretation is that, during crisis,
investors put less emphasis on rare extreme events or potential losses, that is, on fat tails
or leptokurtosis, while immediate exposure through a high standard deviation (realized
risk) gains importance.10 Another interpretation of the low kurtosis and large volatility
observed during the crisis regime would be in terms of the mechanical consequences of
conditional estimations. The following simple example illustrates this. Suppose that the
8We do not go into the analysis of the first moment, which, in line with efficient markets, is equal to 1 by
construction of f(ST /St) (up to discounting).
9For the sake of comparison, note that a log-normal distribution with standard deviation 20% has skewness
of 0.6 and excess kurtosis of 0.7. In particular, skewness is always positive.
10In other words, this interpretation indicates that investors, during crisis, focus on the unfolding risk, while,
during non-crisis regimes, investors worry more about possible/unlikely worst case scenarios. Related
to this interpretation are hypothesis regarding human behavioral traits according to which risk-aversion
versus risk-taking behaviors are modulated by levels of available attention (Gifford, Gifford).
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distribution of daily returns is the sum of two Normal laws with standard deviations 3%
and 20% and weights 99% and 1% respectively. This means that 99% of the returns are
normally distributed with a standard deviation of 3%, and that 1% of the returns are
drawn from a Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of 20%. By construction,
the unconditional excess kurtosis is non zero (27 for the above numerical example). Suppose
that one observes a rare spell of large negative returns in the range of -20%. Conditional on
these realizations, the estimated volatility is large, roughly 20%, while the excess kurtosis
close to 0 a consequence of sampling the second Gaussian law (and Gaussian distributions
have by construction zero excess kurtosis).
It is interesting to note that Jackwerth and Rubinstein (1996) reported opposite behav-
iors in an early derivation of the risk-neutral probability distributions of European options
on the S&P 500 for the period before and after the crash of October 1987. They observed
that the risk-neutral probability of a one-standard deviation loss is larger after the crash
than before, while the reverse is true for higher-level standard deviation losses. The ex-
planation is that, after the 1987 crash, option traders realized that large tail risks were
incorrectly priced, and that the volatility smile was born as a result thereafter (Mackenzie,
2008).
The left tail shape parameter ξ with values of 0.03± 0.23 is surprisingly small: a value
around zero implies that losses are distributed according to a thin tail.11 Moreover, with
−0.19± 0.07, the shape parameter ξ for the right tail is consistently negative indicating a
distribution with compact support, that is, a finite tail for expected gains.
3.2. Regime change points
A striking feature of the time series of the moments and shape parameters is a change of
regime related to the Global Financial Crisis, which is the basis of our subperiod classifi-
cation. A change point analysis of the left tail shape parameter identifies the crisis period
as starting from June 22nd, 2007 and ending in May 4th, 2009. As we obtain similar dates
up to a few months for the change points in risk-neutral volatility, skewness and kurtosis,
this identification is robust and reliable (see Table 1 for details). Indeed, the determina-
tion of the beginning of the crisis as June 2007 is in agreement with the timeline of the
build-up of the financial crisis12 (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 2009), opening the
gates of loss and bankruptcy announcements. Interestingly, when applying the analysis to
11When positive, the tail shape parameter ξ is related to the exponent α of the asymptotic power law tail
by α = 1/ξ.
12(i) S&P’s and Moody’s Investor Services downgraded over 100 bonds backed by second-lien subprime
mortgages on June 1, 2007, (ii) Bear Stearns suspended redemption of its credit strategy funds on June
7, 2007, (iii) S&P put 612 securities backed by subprime residential mortgages on credit watch, (iv)
Countrywide Financial warned of “difficult conditions” on July 24, 2007, (v) American Home Mortgage
Investment Corporation filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on July 31, 2007 and (vi) BNP
Paribas, France’s largest bank, halted redemptions on three investment funds on Aug. 9, 2007 and so
on.
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option-implied returns instead, we detect the onset of the crisis only on September 5th,
2008, more than a year later. This reflects a time lag of the market to fully endogenize
the consequences and implication of the crisis. This is in line with the fact that most
authorities (Federal Reserve, US Treasury, etc.) were downplaying the nature and severity
of the crisis, whose full blown amplitude became apparent to all only with the Lehmann
Brother bankruptcy.
The identification of the end of the crisis in May 2009 is confirmed by the timing of
the surge of actions from the Federal Reserve and the US Treasury Department to salvage
the banks and boost the economy via “quantitative easing”, first implemented in the first
quarter of 2009.13 Another sign of a change of regime, which can be interpreted as the end
of the crisis per se, is the strong rebound of the US stock market that started in March
2009, thus ending a strongly bearish regime characterized by a cumulative loss of more
than 60% since its peak in October 2007.
Finally, note that the higher moments and tail shape parameters of the risk-neutral re-
turn densities in the post-crisis period from May 4th, 2009 to October 23, 2013 progressively
recovered their pre-crisis levels.
3.3. Super-exponential return: bubble behavior before the crash
Apart from the market free fall, which was at its worst in September 2008, the second most
remarkable feature of the time series of option-implied stock returns shown in Figures 1a
and 2a is its regular rise in the years prior to the crisis. For the pre-crisis period from
January 2003 to June 2007, a linear model estimates an average increase in the option-
implied return of about 0.01% per trading day (p-value < 0.001, R2 = 0.82, more details
can be found in Table 2). As a matter of fact, this increase is also present in the realized
returns, from January 2003 until October 2007, i.e. over a slightly longer period, as shown
in Figure 2a. Note, however, that realized returns have a less regular behavior than the ones
implied by options since the former are realized whereas the latter are expected under Q.
An appropriate smoothing such as the exponentially weighted moving average is required
to reveal the trend, see Figure 2a for more details.
In the post-crisis period, in contrast, the option-implied returns exhibit less regularity,
with smaller upward trends punctuated by abrupt drops. We find that option-implied
returns rise on average 0.003% per trading day from May 2009 to October 2013 (p-value
< 0.001). However, a coefficient of determination of R2 = 0.20 suggests that this period is
in fact not well-described by a linear model.
To the best of our knowledge, super-exponential price growth expectations have not
previously been identified as implied by options data. This finding has several important
implications that we shall now detail.
13On March 18, 2009 the Federal Reserve announced to purchase $750 billion of mortgage-backed securities
and up to $300 billion of longer-term Treasury securities within the subsequent year, with other central
banks such as the Bank of England taking similar measures.
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The upward trends of both option-implied and realized returns pre-crisis signal a tran-
sient “super-exponential” behavior of the market price, here of the S&P500 index. To
see this, if the average return r(t) := ln[p(t)/p(t − 1)] grows, say, linearly according to
r(t) ≈ r0 + γt as can be approximately observed in Figure 2a from 2003 to 2007, this
implies p(t) = p(t − 1)er0+γt, whose solution is p(t) = p(0)er0t+γt2 . In absence of the rise
of return (γ = 0), this recovers the standard exponential growth associated with the usual
compounding of interests. However, as soon as γ > 0, the price is growing much faster, in
this case as ∼ et2 . Any price growth of the form ∼ etβ with β > 1 is faster than exponen-
tial and is thus referred to as “super-exponential.” Consequently, if the rise of returns is
faster than linear, the super-exponential acceleration of the price is even more pronounced.
For instance, Hu¨sler et al. (2013) reported empirical evidence of the super-exponential be-
haviour p(t) ∼ eet in controlled lab experiments (which corresponds formally to the limit
β →∞). Corsi and Sornette (2014) presented a simple model of positive feedback between
the growth of the financial sector and that of the real economy, which predicts even faster
super-exponential behaviour, termed transient finite-time singularity (FTS). This dynamics
can be captured approximately by the novel FTS-GARCH, which is found to achieve good
fit for bubble regimes (Corsi and Sornette, 2014). The phenomenon of super-exponential
price growth during a bubble can be accommodated within the framework of a rational
expectation bubble (Blanchard, 1979; Blanchard and Watson, 1982), using for instance
the approach of Johansen et al. (1999, 2000) (JLS model).14 In a nutshell, these models
represent crashes by jumps, whose expectations yield the crash hazard rate. Consequently,
the condition of no-arbitrage translates into a proportionality between the crash hazard
rate and the instantaneous conditional return: as the return increases, the crash hazard
rate grows and a crash eventually breaks the price unsustainable ascension. See Sornette
et al. (2013) for a recent review of many of these models.
Because super-exponential price growth constitutes a deviation from a long-term trend15
that can only be transient, it provides a clear signature of a non-sustainable regime whose
growing return at the same time embodies and feeds over-optimism and herding through
various positive feedback loops. This feature is precisely what allows the association of
these transient super-exponential regimes with what is usually called a “bubble” (Kaizoji
and Sornette, 2009), an approach that has allowed bubble diagnostics ex-post and ex-
ante (see e.g. Johansen et al., 1999; Sornette, 2003; Lin and Sornette, 2011; Sornette and
Cauwels, 2014a,b).
14Alternative rational expectations frameworks include Sornette and Andersen (2002); Lin and Sornette
(2011); Lin et al. (2014). Also related is the literature on mildly explosive bubbles (Phillips et al., 2011,
2012).
15Long-term exponential growth is the norm in economics, finance and demographics. This simply re-
flects the Gibrat law of proportional growth (Gibrat, 1931), which has an extremely broad domain of
application (Yule, 1925; Simon, 1955; Saichev et al., 2009).
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3.4. Dynamics of realized and option-implied returns
Realized S&P 500 and option-implied S&P 500 returns exhibit different behaviors over
time (Figure 2a). Note that this difference persists even after filtering out short-term fluc-
tuations in the realized returns.16 During the pre-crisis period (from January 2003 to June
2007), the two grow at roughly the same rate, but the realized returns grow are approxi-
mately 8% larger than the option-implied returns. This difference can be ascribed to the
“risk premium” that investors require to invest in the stock market, given their aggregate
risk aversion.17 This interpretation of the difference between the two return quantities
as a risk premium, which one may literally term “realized-minus-implied risk premium”,
is based on the fact that the option-implied return is determined under the risk-neutral
probability measure while the realized return is, by construction, unfolding under the real-
world probability measure.18 In other words, the risk-neutral world is characterized by the
assumption that all investors agree on asset prices just on the basis of fair valuation. In
contrast, real-world investors are in general risk-adverse and require an additional premium
to accept the risks associated with their investments. During the crisis, realized returns
plunged faster and deeper in negative territory than the option-implied returns, then re-
covered faster into positive and growing regimes post-crisis. Indeed, during the crisis, the
realized-minus-implied risk premium surprisingly became negative.
While the option-implied returns exhibit a stable behavior punctuated by two sharp
drops in 2010 and 2011 (associated with two episodes of the European sovereign debt
crisis), one can observe that the realized returns have been increasing since 2009, with sharp
drop interruptions, suggesting bubbly regimes diagnosed by transient super-exponential
dynamics (Sornette and Cauwels, 2014b). Furthermore, the realized-minus-implied risk
premium has steadily grown since 2009, reaching approximately 16% at the end of the
analyzed period (October 2013), i.e. twice its pre-crisis value. This is qualitatively in
agreement with other analyses (Graham and Harvey, 2013) and can be rationalized by the
need for investors to be remunerated against growing uncertainties of novel kinds, such as
created by unconventional policies and sluggish economic recovery.19
16Realized S&P 500 returns show more rapid fluctuations than option-implied ones, which is not surprising
given that the former are realized whereas the latter are expected (under Q). In this section we only
focus on dynamics on a longer timescale, thus Figure 2a presents realized returns smoothed by an
exponential weighted moving average (EWMA) of daily returns over 750 trading days. Different values
or smoothing methods lead to similar outcomes.
17To understand variations in the risk premium in relation to the identification of different price regimes,
we cannot rely on many of the important more sophisticated quantitative methods for derivation of the
the risk premium, but refer to the literature discussed in the introduction. There are many avenues for
promising future research to develop hybrid approaches between these more sophisticated approaches
and ours which a priori allows the premium to vary freely over time.
18The standard definition, which usually takes the expected 10-year S&P 500 return relative to a 10-year
U.S. Treasury bond yield (Fernandez, 2013; Duarte and Rosa, 2013) captures different information.
19An incomplete list of growing uncertainties at that time is: instabilities in the middle-East, concerns about
sustainability of China’s growth and issues of its on-going transitions, and many other uncertainties
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3.5. Granger causality between option-implied returns and the 3-month
Treasury Bill
We now examine possible Granger-causality relationships between option-implied returns
and 3-month Treasury Bill yields. First note that option-implied returns and the 3-month
Treasury Bill yields reveal a much weaker correlation than between realized returns and
option-implied returns. A casual glance at Figure 2b suggests that their pre-crisis behaviors
are similar, up to a vertical translation of approximately 3%. To see if the Fed rate policy
might have been one of the drivers of the pre-crisis stock market dynamics, we perform a
Granger causality test in both directions. Since a Granger test is only defined for stationary
time series, we consider first differences in option-implied S&P 500 returns and 3-month
Treasury Bill yields, respectively. Precisely, we define
SPt = rt − rt−1, TBt = yt − yt−1. (5)
where rt is the option-implied return (4) and yt is the Bill yield at trading day t. Before
testing, we standardize both SPt and TBt, i.e. we subtract the mean and divide by the
standard deviation, respectively.
There is no evidence that Federal Reserve policy has influenced risk-neutral option-
implied returns over this period, as a Granger causality test fails to reject the relevant
null at any lag (see Table 3 and Figure 3a). The other direction of Granger causality
is more interesting, revealing Granger-causal influence of the option-implied returns on
the 3-month Treasury Bill. A Granger causality test for SPt on TBt rejects the null for
a lag of m = 5 trading days. This suggests that the Fed policy has been responding
to, rather than leading, the development of the market expectations during the pre-crisis
period. Previous works using a time-adaptive lead-lag technique had only documented
that stock markets led Treasury Bills yields as well as longer term bonds yields during
bubble periods (Zhou and Sornette, 2004; Guo et al., 2011). It is particularly interesting
to find a Granger causality of the forward-looking expected returns, as extracted from
option data, onto a backward-looking Treasury Bill yield in the pre-crisis period and the
reverse thereafter. Thus, expectations were dominant in the pre-crisis period as is usually
the case in efficient markets, while realized monetary policy was (and still is in significant
parts) shaping expectations post-crisis (as shown in Table 3 and Figure 3b). The null
of no influence is rejected for Treasury Bill yields Granger causing option-implied returns
lagged by 50 to 200 days. This is coherent with the view that the Fed monetary policy,
developed to catalyze economic recovery via monetary interventionism, has been the key
variable influencing investors and thus options/stock markets.
Analyses of Granger causality with respect to realized returns yield no comparable re-
sults. Indeed, mutual influences with respect to Bivariate Granger tests involving the first
difference time series of realized returns (with both option-implied returns and Treasury
involving other major economic players, such as Japan, India and Brazil, quantitative easing operations
in the US, political will from European leaders and actions of the ECB to hold the eurozone together.
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Bill yields) confirm the results that would have been expected. Both prior to and af-
ter the crisis, Treasury Bill yields Granger-cause realized returns over long time periods
(p < 0.1 for lags of 150 and 200 trading days, respectively), whereas option-implied returns
Granger-cause realized ones over short time periods (p < 0.01 for a lag of 5 trading days).
4. Conclusion
We have extracted risk-neutral return probability distributions from S&P 500 stock in-
dex options from 2003 to 2013. Change point analysis identifies the crisis as taking place
from mid-2007 to mid-2009. The evolution of risk-neutral return probability distributions
characterizing the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis regimes reveal a number of remarkable
properties. Indeed paradoxically at first sight, the distributions of expected returns be-
came very close to a normal distribution during the crisis period, while exhibiting strongly
negative skewness and especially large kurtosis in the two other periods. This reflects that
investors may care more about the risks being realized (volatility) during the crisis, while
they focus on potential losses (fat left tails, negative skewness and large kurtosis) in quieter
periods.
Our most noteworthy finding is the continuing increase of the option-implied average
returns during the pre-crisis (from January 2003 to mid-2007), which more than paral-
lels a corresponding increase in realized returns. While a constant average return implies
standard exponential price growth, an increase of average returns translates into super-
exponential price growth, which is unsustainable and therefore transient. This finding cor-
roborates previous reports on increasing realized returns and accelerated super-exponential
price trajectories, which previously have been found to be hallmarks of exuberance and
bubbles preceding crashes.
Moreover, the comparison between realized and option-implied expected returns sheds
new light on the development of the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. A general
feature is that realized returns adapt much faster to changes of regimes, indeed often
overshooting. Interpreted as a risk premium, literally the “realized-minus-implied risk
premium”, these overshoots can be interpreted as transient changes in the risk perceptions
of investors. We find that the realized-minus-implied risk premium was approximately
8% in the pre-crisis, and has doubled to 16% in the post-crisis period (from mid-2009 to
October 2013). This increase is likely to be associated with growing uncertainties and
concern with uncertainties, fostered possibly by unconventional financial and monetary
policy and unexpectedly sluggish economic recovery.
Finally, our Granger causality tests demonstrate that, in the pre-crisis period, changes
of option-implied returns lead changes of Treasury Bill yields with a short lag, while the
reverse is true with longer lags post-crisis. In a way, the post-crisis period can thus be seen
as a return to a “normal” regime in the sense of standard economic theory, according to
which interest rate policy determines the price of money/borrowing, which then spills over
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to the real economy and the stock market. What makes it a “new normal” (El-Erian, 2011)
is that zero-interest rate policies in combination with other unconventional policy actions
actually dominate and bias investment opportunities. The pre-crisis reveals the opposite
phenomenon in the sense that expected (and realized returns) lead the interest rate, thus
in a sense “slaving” the Fed policy to the markets. It is therefore less surprising that such
an abnormal period, previously referred to as the “Great Moderation” and hailed as the
successful taming of recessions, was bound to end in disappointments as a bubble was built
up (Sornette and Woodard, 2010; Sornette and Cauwels, 2014a).
These results make clear the existence of important time-varying dynamics in both equity
and variance risk premia, as exemplified by the difference between the pre- and post-
crisis periods in terms of the Granger causalities. The option-implied returns show that
expectations have been changed by the 2008 crisis, and this confirms another massive
change of expectations following the crash of October 1987, embodied in the appearance
of the volatility smile (Mackenzie, 2008). We believe that extending our analysis to more
crises will confirm the importance of accounting for changes of expectations and time-
varying premia, and we will address these issues in future research.
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Returns and distributional moments implied by S&P 500 options
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Figure 1: This figure presents returns and distributional moments implied by S&P 500 options.
Structural changes around the financial crisis are identified consistently with a change
point analysis of the means of the higher moments and tail shape parameters (vertical
lines).
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Option-implied returns vs realized returns and Treasury Bill yields
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(a) Annualized realized returns and option-implied S&P 500 returns.
Realized returns are calculated by exponential weighted moving
average (EWMA) smoothing of daily returns over 750 trading
days.
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(b) 3-month Treasury Bill yields and annualized option-implied S&P
500 returns (5-day moving averages).
Figure 2: This figure presents time series of option-implied S&P 500 returns, realized re-
turns and Treasury Bill yields over the time period 2003–2013.
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(a) Pre-crisis: January 1st, 2003 to June 22nd, 2007. No evidence for
Treasury Bill yields Granger causing option-implied S&P 500 returns
at any lag, but rather that option-implied S&P 500 returns Granger
cause Treasury Bill yields at lags of a few trading days.
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(b) Post-crisis: May 4th, 2009 to October 23rd, 2013. Treasury Bill yields
Granger cause option-implied S&P 500 returns over a large range of
lags.
Figure 3: Subperiod Granger causality tests on incremental changes in annualized option-
implied S&P 500 returns and 3-month Treasury Bill yields. The p = 0.05 line is
plotted as dashed black.
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Figure 4: Risk-neutral density implied by S&P 500 options from 2010-10-06 for index levels
on 2010-12-18. The empirical part is directly inferred from option quotes, whereas
tails must be estimated to account for the range beyond observable strike prices.
Together, they give the full risk-neutral density. The method is reviewed in
section 2.1 and appendix A.
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Table 1: Start and end dates of the Global Financial Crisis as identified by a change point
analysis of statistical properties of option-implied risk-neutral densities. The dates
found in the left tail shape parameter and higher moments identify consistently
the crisis period as ca. June 2007 to ca. October 2009. Interestingly, the return
time series signals the beginning only more than a year later, as September 2008.
See section 2.3 for a review of the method, and 3.2 for a more detailed discussion
of the results.
Variable Crisis start date Crisis end date
Left tail shape parameter 2007-06-22∗∗∗ 2009-05-04∗∗∗
Right tail shape parameter 2005-08-08∗∗∗ 2009-01-22∗∗∗
Risk-neutral volatility 2007-07-30∗∗∗ 2009-11-12∗∗∗
Skewness 2007-06-22∗∗∗ 2009-10-19∗∗∗
Kurtosis 2007-06-19∗∗∗ NAa
Option-implied returns 2008-09-05∗∗∗ 2009-07-17∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
a No change point indicating a crisis end date found.
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Table 2: Results of a linear regression of option-implied returns of the S&P 500 index on
time (trading days) by sub-period. In particular, a linear model fits well the
pre-crisis, indicating the regular rise of expected returns, but not the post-crisis.
This translates into super-exponential price growth expectations in the pre-crisis
period. Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Option-implied returns (in percent):
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
linear coefficient 0.009∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
per trading day (0.0001) (0.002) (0.0002)
Constant −4.747∗∗∗ 2.836∗∗∗ −5.775∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.485) (0.097)
Observations 942 411 958
R2 0.820 0.520 0.196
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table 3: This table reports the results of a Granger-causality test of option-implied S&P
500 returns and Treasure Bill yields by sub-period. While we do not find evidence
that Treasury Bill yields may have Granger-caused implied returns pre-crisis, there
is Granger-influence in the other direction at a lag of 5 trading days both pre- and
especially post-crisis. Notably, our test strongly suggests that post-crisis Treasury
Bill yields have Granger-causal influence on option-implied returns at lags of 50
to 200 trading days.
Pre-crisis
S&P Granger-causes T-Bill T-Bill Granger-causes S&P
Lag F-ratioa Degrees of freedom F-ratioa Degrees of freedom
5 2.72* 5, 926 0.23 5, 926
50 0.84 50, 791 0.82 50, 791
100 0.82 100, 641 0.92 100, 641
150 0.92 150, 491 0.77 150, 491
200 0.86 200, 341 0.87 200, 341
250 0.95 250, 191 0.83 250, 191
Post-crisis
S&P Granger-causes T-Bill T-Bill Granger-causes S&P
Lag F-ratioa Degrees of freedom F-ratioa Degrees of freedom
5 1.95* 5, 942 0.56 5, 942
50 0.69 50, 807 1.37* 50, 807
100 0.79 100, 657 1.55** 100, 657
150 1.07 150, 507 1.32* 150, 507
200 1.16 200, 357 1.23* 200, 357
250 1.06 250, 207 1.18 250, 207
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
a Refers to the F -test for joint significance of the lagged variables.
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A. Estimating the risk-neutral density from option quotes
In this study, we estimate the option-implied risk-neutral density with a method developed
by Figlewski (2010), which is based on equation (1). For completeness, we shall briefly
review the method as employed in this paper, but refer the interested reader to the original
document for more detail. The raw data are end-of-day bid and ask quotes of European
call and put options on the S&P 500 stock market index with a chosen maturity. Very deep
out of the money options exhibit spreads that are large relative to the bid, i.e. carry large
noise. Due to the redundancy of calls and puts, we may discard quotes with bid prices
smaller than $0.50. In this paper, we perform the calculation with mid-prices, which by
inverting the Black-Scholes model translate into implied volatilities.
In a window of ±$20.00 around the at-the-money level, the implied volatilities of put and
call options are combined as weighted averages. The weights are chosen in order to ensure
a smooth transition from puts to calls by gradually blending calls into puts when going to
higher strikes. Below and above that window, we only use call and put data, respectively.
We then fit a fourth order polynomial in implied volatility space. Here, we deviate slightly
from Figlewski (2010) because we use open interest as fitting weights. By doing so, we give
more weight to data points carrying more market information. The Black-Scholes model
transforms the fit in implied volatility space back to price space. The resulting density
bulk is called “empirical density”.
To obtain a density estimate beyond the range of observable strike prices, we must
append tails to the empirical part. Figlewski (2010) proposes to add tails of the family of
generalized extreme value (GEV20) distributions with connection conditions: a) matching
value at the 2%, 5%, 92% and 95% quantile points, and b) matching probability mass in the
estimated tail and empirical density. An example can be seen in Figure 4. The empirical
density together with the tails give the complete risk-neutral density.
B. Change point detection
The following framework is used for significance testing in section 3.2 and Table 1. For
more details, see Cso¨rgo¨ and Horva´th (1997). Let x1, x2, ..., xn be independent, real-valued
observations. We test the “no change point” null hypothesis,
H0 : E(x1) = E(x2) = ... = E(xn), (6)
against the “one change in mean” hypothesis,
H1 : there is a k, 1 ≤ k < n, such that E(x1) = ... = E(xk) 6= E(xk+1) = ... = E(xn), (7)
20See Embrechts et al. (1997) for a detailed theoretical discussion of GEV distributions and modeling
extreme events.
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using the auxiliary functions
A(x) :=
√
2 log log x , D(x) := 2 log log x+
1
2
log log log x− 1
2
log pi . (8)
Then, following corollary 2.1.2 and in light of remark 2.1.2. (Cso¨rgo¨ and Horva´th, 1997,
pp. 67-68), under mild regularity conditions, H0 and for large sample sizes, one has
P
(
A(n) max
k
1
σˆn
(
n
k(n− k)
)1/2 ∣∣∣∣S(k)− knS(n)
∣∣∣∣−D(n) ≤ t
)
= exp
(−2e−t) , (9)
where σˆn is the sample standard deviation and S(t) :=
∑t
i=1 xi the cumulative sum of
observations.
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